Abstract. We consider the problem of computing Nash Equilibria of action-graph games (AGGs). AGGs, introduced by Bhat and Leyton-Brown, is a succinct representation of games that encapsulates both 'local'dependencies as in graphical games, and partial indifference to other agents' identities as in anonymous games, which occur in many natural settings. This is achieved by specifying a graph on the set of actions, so that the payoff of an agent for selecting a strategy depends only on the number of agents playing each of the neighboring strategies in the action graph. We present a Polynomial Time Approximation Scheme for computing mixed Nash equilibria of AGGs with constant treewidth and a constant number of agent types (and an arbitrary number of strategies), together with hardness results for the cases when either the treewidth or the number of agent types is unconstrained. In particular, we show that even if the action graph is a tree, but the number of agent-types is unconstrained, it is NP-complete to decide the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium and PPAD-complete to compute a mixed Nash equilibrium (even an approximate one); similarly for symmetric AGGs (all agents belong to a single type), if we allow arbitrary treewidth. These hardness results suggest that, in some sense, our PTAS is as strong of a positive result as one can expect.
Definition 1. An action-graph game, A, is a tuple P, S, G, u where -P := {1, . . . , n} is the set of agents. Note that AGGs are fully expressive because any games can be written as an action graph game in which the strategy sets of different players are disjoint, and the strategy graph G is complete.
We now define a further type of possible symmetry between agents that will be important in our analysis of the complexity of computing Nash equilibria.
Definition 2.
We say that an AGG has k player types if there exists a partition of the agents into k sets P 1 , . . . , P k , such that if p, p ′ ∈ P i , then S p = S p ′ . (The terminology of [15] refers to such games as k-symmetric AGGs.)
Since agents who play the same strategy receive the same utility, all agents of a given type are identical-for example an AGG with a single player type is a symmetric game. While the number of player types does not significantly alter the description size, decreasing the number of player types constrains the space of possible Nash equilibria; this is the motivation for considering AGGs with few player types as a possible class of tractable games.
A strategy profile, M := [m 1 , . . . , m n ], with m i = (p i,1 , . . . , p i,|Si| ) assigns to each agent a probability distribution over the possible strategies that the agent may play, with Pr[s(i) = s i,k ] = p i,k where s k is the k th element of S i . Thus a given strategy profile induces an expected utility for each player E[u|M ] = D∈∆ u(D) Pr(D), where the probability is with respect to the strategy profile M .
Definition 3.
A strategy profile M is a Nash-equilibrium if no player can increase her expected utility by changing her strategy m i given the strategy profiles m −i of the other agents. That is, for all strategy profiles m
Definition 4.
A strategy m ∈ M is an ǫ-Nash-equilibrium if no player can increase her expected utility by more than ǫ by changing her strategy profile.
Note that there is the slightly stronger definition of an ǫ-Nash equilibrium in which, for all agents i, the expected utility of playing every strategy s in the support of m i is at most ǫ less than the expected utility of playing a different s ′ ∈ S i . We do not stress the distinction, as our PTAS finds such an ǫ-Nash equilibrium, and our hardness results apply to the weaker definition given above.
PTAS
Action graph games have properties of both anonymous games and graphical games. As such, one might expect that classes of AGGs that resemble tractable classes of anonymous or graphical games could have efficiently computable equilibria. For anonymous games, the symmetry imposed by the limited number of types implies the existence of a highly symmetric mixed equilibrium which seems easier to find than asymmetric equilibria. For graphical games with small treewidth, the tree structure allows for an efficient message-passing dynamic-programming approach. For AGGs with a bounded number of player types and a strategy graph of constant treewidth, we give a PTAS for computing ǫ-Nash equilibria that uses both the symmetry implied by bounding the number of player types, and a dynamic programming approach that exploits the tree structure. While these conditions might seem strong, we show in Section 3 that if either condition is omitted the problem of computing an ǫ-Nash equilibrium is hard. 
We refer to such equilibria as type-symmetric equilibria.
The the high-level outline of the PTAS is as follows: we discretize the space of mixed strategy profiles such that each player may play a given strategy with probability N δ for N ∈ N, and some fixed δ > 0 that will depend on ǫ and n. We also discretize the space of target expected utilities into the set V = {0, ǫ/2, ǫ, . . . , 1}. Then, for each i ∈ {0, . . . , |V |}, starting from the leaves of the strategy-graph tree, we employ dynamic programming to efficiently search the discretized strategy space for a type-symmetric ǫ-Nash equilibrium in which each strategy in the support has an expected utility close to v i . To accomplish this we associate to each strategy s i a polynomially sized table expressing the set of probabilities with which s i could be played so that some assignment of probabilities to the strategies below s i in the strategy tree could be extended to such an ǫ-Nash equilibrium for the whole game. The following lemma guarantees the existence of such a type-symmetric ǫ-Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 1.
Given an n-player AGG A, with 1 player type and strategy graph G A with maximum degree d, for any δ > 0 there is a strategy profile Q = (q 1 , . . . , q |S| ) with each q i a multiple of δ and the property that if all agents play profile Q, for any strategy s in the support of
The following standard fact will be necessary in our proof:
Proof of Lemma 1: From Fact 2, there exists a strategy profile P = (p 1 , . . . , p |S| ) which is a Nash equilibrium of A. Consider a strategy profile Q with the property that q i = 0 if p i = 0, and otherwise |q i − p i | ≤ δ. (Note that such a profile clearly exists.)strategy s i with ν(s i ) = d, we now show that
from which our lemma follows. For a single neighbor s j of s i , from Fact 3 |Pr(D(s j ) = k|Q) − Pr(D(s j ) = k|P )| ≤ δn, and thus if we were to replace p j by q j in profile P , this change would affect the expectation of playing s i by at most δn. Applying this reasoning to each of the d neighbors completes our proof.
We now describe the PTAS; for clarity we describe the algorithm in the case that k = 1, and G A is a tree with maximum degree 3, although it extends easily to a constant number of player types and constant treewidth. The following definition simplifies our description of the algorithm.
Definition 5.
We say that some set of strategy profiles is an ǫ-partial equilibrium for a subset S ′ ⊂ S of strategies if, for all strategies s i played with nonzero probability, the expected utility of playing s i is at most ǫ less than the expected utility of playing some other
Consider a fixed ǫ > 0, and an n-player AGG A = P, S, G, u with k types, with strategies S = {s 1 , . . . , s |S| } and strategy graph G A that is a tree with maximum degree of 3. Arbitrarily choose some strategy with degree 1 as the root of G A , and without loss of generality denote it by s 1 . Given a strategy s i , let s R(i) , s L(i) denote the right and left children of s i in the strategy graph. If s i has only one child, let s R(i) denote this child and s L(i) = null. Fix δ = -partial equilibrium in the set of strategies below s i in G A with expected utility near v i and strategies s i , s R(i) , s L(i) played with probabilities p, p R , p L , respectively, where the probability of choosing strategy s i , or one that lies below s i is w. In addition to f i , we also construct another table g i : I 4 δ × V → I 2 δ that will facilitate the reconstruction of an ǫ-Nash equilibrium after having computed all the tables f i and g i . The g i will record the total weight used in each of the partial solutions which were combined. A given element of g i will never be used if the corresponding element of f i is 0, and for simplicity we neglect to define g i for these entries. Starting from the leaves, we calculate the tables f i , g i as follows:
′ ∈ I δ such that the following conditions hold:
,w L ∈ I δ such that the following conditions hold:
Note that there may be multiple choices of
L that satisfy the above conditions, in which case
•
• if p R = 0 the expected utility of playing s R(1) is at most v + ǫ 2 given that s 1 , s R(R(1)) , s L(R(1)) are played with respective probabilities p, q R , q L .
• if s 1 > 0 the expected utility of playing
given that s R(1) is played with probability p R .
• if s 1 = 0 the expected utility of playing s 1 is at most v + ǫ 2 given that s R(1) is played with probability p R .
• w = w ′ + p
The following lemma ensures that the tables f i behave as hoped, and we find at least one approximate Nash equilibria. The proof follows from the definition above and induction on the tree structure. For the sake of brevity we omit a formal proof. (q 1 , . . . , q |S| ) that is a ǫ 4 -Nash equilibrium of the form guaranteed in Lemma 1, then for all i, f i (q i , q R(i) , q L(i) , w, v) = 1, where v is chosen to be a multiple of ǫ/2 and to be within ǫ/2 of the expected utility of playing any strategy in the support, and w is the sum of the weights on strategy i and its descendants in the tree.
Lemma 2. Given a strategy profile
The following two lemmas demonstrate that the tables f i can be computed efficiently, and that given the tables, an ǫ-Nash equilibrium can be efficiently computed.
Lemma 3.
The tables f 0 , . . . , f |S| and g 0 , . . . , g |S| can be computed efficiently.
Proof. The size of each table is polynomially sized. f i and g i can be computed efficiently given the tables f R(i) , f L(i) .
Lemma 4.
Given the tables f 0 , . . . , f |S| , and ǫ-Nash equilibrium can be found efficiently.
Proof. Starting from the root of the tree G A , we will populate a strategy profile (p 1 , . . . , p |S| ) that will be a typesymmetric ǫ-Nash equilibrium. Lemmas 2 and 1 guarantee that there will be some choice of p, p R ∈ I δ , and v ∈ V such that f 1 (p, p R , 0, 1, v) = 1. We set p 1 = p, p R(1) = p R , and 'pass' w = 1 − p 1 and v to strategy s R (1) . For all other strategies s i , with i ≥ 2 such that p i has already been fixed but p R(i) , p L(i) have not been fixed yet, the parent of s i will have passed a pair w, v. In the case that s i has one child, from our construction of f i , it follows that there must be a choice of q R ∈ I δ such that f i (p i , q R , 0, w − p i , v) = 1. We then set p R(i)) = q R and p L(i) = q L and pass the pair w ′ = w − p i , v to s R(i) . In the case that s i has two children, from our construction of f i , it follows that there must be a choice of q R , q L ∈ I δ such that f i (p i , q R , q L , w, v) = 1, and
We then set p R(i)) = q R , p L(i)) = q L , and pass the pairs w R , v and w L , v to the right and left children, respectively. From our construction, it follows that i p i = 1, and that for every strategy s i in the support, the expected utility of playing that strategy is at most ǫ less than the expected utility of playing any other strategy. In particular, (p 1 , . . . , p |S| ) is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium.
This algorithm and proof easily extends to the case where there are a constant k player types: simply create tables f for each type j : 1 ≤ j ≤ k and strategy i : 1 ≤ j ≤ |S| and proceed analogously but additionally require that f
That is, enforce that each player type only play the strategies available.
Additionally, using a standard technique, the algorithm extends to the case where the tree-width is bounded by some constant t. Intuitively, in this case the strategy graph decomposes into a tree over cliques of size t of vertices on the graph. All the vertices in each clique are processed simultaneously. Because t is constant, the increase in running time is polynomial.
Finally, one could consider the setting in which there is an unbounded number of player types, but each type consists of a connected region of the tree. An analogue of the above algorithm can handle this setting provided not too many player types can play any particular strategy. 
Hardness Results
In this section we state and prove our four hardness results. We show that it is (1) NP-complete to decide the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria, and (2) PPAD complete to approximate general (mixed Nash) equilibria for the classes of action graph games that either (a) have action graphs of treewidth 1 or (b) are symmetric (all agents are of a single type). Our two hardness results for pure equilibria will come from reductions from the NP-complete problem CIRCUITSAT, and follow the approach of [23] . Our hardness results for approximating mixed Nash equilibria are via equilibria-preserving gadgets that let us reduce from the PPAD-complete problem of computing equilibria in the class of graphical games where the maximum degree is 3 and each player has only two possible strategies. We begin by showing that action graph games are in the class PPAD.
Mapping Action Graph Games to Graphical Games
We show the following result which reduces the problem of computing a Nash equilibrium of an action graph game to the problem of computing a Nash equilibrium of a graphical game. Since the latter is in PPAD [19] , it follows that the former is in PPAD as well.
Theorem 4. Any action-graph game A can be mapped in polynomial time to a graphical game G so that there is a polynomial-time computable surjective mapping from the set of Nash equilibria of G to the set of Nash equilibria of A.
Proof. Let us define a bounded division-free straight-line program to be an arithmetic binary circuit with nodes performing addition, subtraction, or multiplication on their inputs, or evaluating to pre-set constants, with the additional constraint that the values of all the nodes remain in [0, 1].
We will show that there exists a bounded division-free staight-line program of polynomial size in the description of the action graph game which, given a mixed strategy profile M := {(p i,1 , . . . , p i,|Si| )} n i=1 , computes, for every agent i, i = 1, . . . , n, and for every pure strategy s i , s i ∈ S i , of that agent, the expected utility that this agent gets for playing pure strategy s i . The proof then follows from Theorems 1 and 2 of [7] .
Without loss of generality, we will show that there exists a straight-line program of polynomial size for computing the expected utility of agent 1 for playing pure strategy s 1,1 . For this purpose, let N := ν(s 1,1 ) and ∆ := ∆(ν (s 1,1 ) ). Also, for any subset P ′ ⊆ P of the agents, let ∆ P ′ be the set of valid configurations of the agents of the set P ′ to the strategies in N , represented as |N |-tuples of numbers; then, for every D ∈ ∆ P ′ , let Pr P ′ [D] be the probability that configuration D arises from the set of agents P ′ , where the measure Pr P ′ is taken over the mixed strategies of agents in P ′ . Using this notation, the expected payoff of agent 1 for playing s 1,1 can be written as follows
where 1 s1,1 is an |N |-tuple of numbers having a 1 at the coordinate corresponding to strategy s 1,1 and 0 everywhere else, and where D + 1 s1,1 represents coordinate-wise addition. From Equation (1), it follows that, if there is a bounded division-free straight-line program of polynomial size which computes the values {Pr P \{1} [D]} D∈∆ P \{1} , a straight-line program for computing U 1,s1,1 can be constructed at an additional cost of O(|∆ P \{1} |) = O(|A|) arithmetic gates. To conclude the proof, we prove the following lemma. Proof. Note first that |∆ Pj ∪{j} | = O(|A|), where |A| is the description size of the action graph game. Then, for every D ∈ ∆ Pj ∪{j} , it holds that 
A Copy Gadget
As a preliminary to the hardness results of the next two subsections, we describe a copy gadget which will prove useful in both NP-completeness and PPAD-completeness results. Intuitively, to simulate games G of high treewidth by treewidth 1 action graph games H, we create several "copies" of each player, but only one copy of each edge relating players, thus ending up with a very "sparse" simulation, whose treewidth we can control. Explicitly, given an AGG A, and an agent i whose strategy set consists of the two strategies S i = {f i , t i }, our copy gadget will add two additional players a, c, of which player c will be the "copy" and player a is an auxiliary player, whose inclusion will allow player i's strategies to be disconnected from player c's. We add strategies for a and c that are {f a , t a } and {f c , t c } respectively, and set the incentives so that in any Nash equilibrium Pr[ 
Definition 7.
Given an AGG A = P, S, G, u , and an agent i with two strategy choices S i = {f i , t i }, we create AGG A ′ = P ′ , S ′ , G ′ , u ′ from A via the addition of a copy gadget on i as follows:
-P ′ := P ∪ {a, c}. -S ′ := (S 1 , . . . , S |P | , S a , S c ), where S a = {f a , t a }, and S c = {f c , t c }, where f a , t a , f c , t c ∈ S. -G ′ consists of the graph G with the additional vertices corresponding to f a , t a , f c , t c , and the directed edges (f i , f a ), (t a , f c ), (f c , t a ). Proof. The first two properties follow directly from Definition 7. For the third property, assume otherwise and consider the case where p c,f > ǫ + p i,f . Agent a's expected utility for playing f a is p i,f , and is p c,f for playing t a , thus our assumption that p c,f > ǫ + p i,f implies that agent a must be playing t a with probability at least 1 − ǫ since the game is at ǫ 2 -equilibrium. Given that a plays t a with probability at least 1 − ǫ, agent b maximizes her utility by playing t c , and thus p c,f ≤ ǫ, which contradicts our assumption that p c,f is the larger of p c,f , p i,f , namely at least 1 2 . An analogous argument applies to rule out the case p c,f < p i,f − ǫ.
PPAD-Completeness
Our PPAD-Completeness results are reductions from the problem of computing equilibria in graphical games, and rely on the following fact due to [4] .
